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Shareholder and Director Liability for
Unpaid Workers' Wages in Canada:
From Condition of Granting Limited
Liability to Exceptional Remedy
ERIC TUCKER
I. Labor Law's Recurring Dilemma
The essence of the contract of employment is the performance of service in
exchange for wages. As such, labor assumes a commodity form-a capacity
that is bought and sold in labor markets. But because labor cannot be sepa-
rated from its bearer, and is not produced for the market, it has been widely
recognized as a special or fictive commodity' that has been the subject of a
distinct legal regime. Historically, that distinct regime-here referred to as
employment law-has served both disciplinary and protective functions. On
the one hand, it assists employers to extract from the worker the value of
the labor they have purchased, while on the other it protects workers against
1. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 73. Also see
Jamie Peck, Workplace: The Social Regulation of Labor Markets (New York: Guilford Press,
1996), ch. 2.
Eric Tucker is a professor at Osgoode Hall Law School <etucker@yorku.ca>. The
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unacceptable exploitation. While these functions are a constant, the scope and
techniques of legal discipline and protection vary over time and place, as does
the balance between them, depending on such factors as the development of
social relations of production, the balance of power between workers and
employers, dominant ideologies, etc. In the fulfillment of these functions, law
has encountered a series of recurring dilemmas that stem structurally from
labor's special commodity status and socially and politically from conflicts
between workers' and employers' interests.
This article is part of a larger project that aims to identify and trace these
recurring dilemmas in the history of Canadian employment law. Here the
focus is on the history of a single strand of the wage protection function-
shareholder and director liability for unpaid workers' wages. The recurring
demand for wage protection arises from the near universal practice of
paying workers in arrears-that is, after they have provided service. As a
result, workers become their employers' creditors and bear some risk that
they will not be paid. It is clearly unacceptable, however, for workers not
to be remunerated for the service they provided: non-payment of wages is a
breach of employers' most fundamental contractual obligation to workers.
It is a cause of hardship to workers and their dependent family members
who, without the cushion of significant savings or accumulations of prop-
erty, rely on wages to meet their basic needs. As a result, when workers'
wages are unpaid, not only are they deeply aggrieved, but also the fictive
nature of their commodity status becomes glaringly obvious and there is
widespread recognition that an injustice has occurred. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the protection of workers' wages has deep roots in the history
of employment law, dating back to the Statute ofArtificers.2 Wage protec-
tion has taken numerous forms, including: special procedures for bringing
actions to recover wages; some preference in bankruptcy proceedings; liens
on property whose value has been increased by the performance of labor;
contractor liability for sub-contractors; and shareholder or director liability
for unpaid wages owed by the corporation to employees.3 Regardless of the
2. 5 Eliz. c. 4 (1562). For a discussion of the background to the statute, see Donald Wood-
ward, 'The Background to the Statute of Artificers: The Genesis of Labour Policy, 1558-63,"
Economic History Review, n.s. 33 (1980): 32-44. On the operation of the act and its use for
wage recovery, see Douglas Hay, "England 1562-1875: The Law and Its Uses," in Masters,
Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955, ed. Paul Craven and Douglas
Hay (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 59-116. The earlier Ordinance
of Laborers (1349) 23 Edw. III and Statute of Laborers (1351) 25 Edw. III, stat. 2, made
no provision for wage recovery. See Robert C. Palmer, English Law in the Age of the Black
Death, 1348-1381 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 14-23.
3. For an early survey of Canadian wage protection laws, see "Legislation in Canada with
Regard to Payment and Protection of Wages," Labour Gazette (October 1906), 377-87.
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legal form and technique, the protection of workers' wages runs up against
other norms deeply embedded in the legal regime, norms that constitute
the legal infrastructure of capitalism, or what will be called here capitalist
legality. Thus one manifestation of the recurring dilemmas of labor law is
in the negotiation of the conflict between the demand for wage protection
and competing norms of capitalist legality.
The history of shareholder and director liability for unpaid workers' wages
is a particularly useful place to begin exploring the theme of recurring dilem-
mas because it engages with the construction of a central feature of modem
corporate law and capitalist legality-the limited liability of shareholders
and directors for the debts of the business corporation. 4 Indeed, as this article
demonstrates, the two are closely intertwined: in parts of Canada and the
United States the demand for wage protection did not arise to confront a pre-
existing corporate law, but was present in the process of its creation, needing
to be accommodated in the first general incorporation statutes. Numerous
Canadian and American legislatures responded to this demand by making
shareholder and later director liability for unpaid workers' wages a condition
of granting widespread access to the privilege of forming limited liability
corporations. Yet within a short time, judicial decision making inverted this
understanding of the conditionality of limited liability. It reconstructed lim-
ited liability as a basic norm of capitalist legality rather than as an exceptional
privilege. In so doing, the courts also transformed the protection of workers'
wages from a normative and legal condition of granting corporate investors
and managers the privilege of limited liability into an exceptional privilege
granted by the state in derogation of the norm of limited liability. Then, on
the basis of this inversion, judges narrowly interpreted the scope of director
liability for unpaid workers' wages both in relation to who and what was
protected. The judicial inversion, however, was neither total nor did it com-
pletely resolve the tension between the demand for wage protection and the
claim of limited liability once and for all. Some judges continued to give
priority to wage protection, legislation was enacted extending the personal
scope of wage protection laws to all employees, and proposals to abolish
shareholder or director liability for workers' wages entirely have not been
implemented, even by conservative governments. The dilemma is indeed a
recurring one.
4. Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, "What Is Corporate Law?" in The Anatomy
of Corporate Law, ed. Reiner Kraakman et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1,
8-10. Their view that the widespread adoption of limited liability for corporations is strong
evidence of its value is contested by recent works in economic sociology that see the triumph
of the modem corporation as a political accomplishment of powerful actors. See Charles
Perrow, Organizing America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), esp. 207-9 and
William G. Roy, Socializing Capital (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
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This article is organized in the following way. The next section explores
the history of shareholder and director liability for workers' wages and its
place in the enactment of the first general incorporation statutes in Canada.
It covers the period from 1800 to 1860. The third section examines a series
of cases in which the courts were called upon to determine which workers
were entitled to recover against shareholders or directors for unpaid wages.
In the course of resolving these cases, the courts inverted wage protection
from a condition of limited liability to an exceptional privilege. This covers
the period from the 1890 to 1970. In contrast to the prior section, which
offers a more deeply contextualized study, section three offers a doctrinal
history, but does locate that history broadly in the changing social, economic,
and political background. Although perhaps unfashionable, this approach is
justified for two reasons. First, the work of legally inverting personal liability
from a foundational norm to an anomalous exception, and thereby limiting
the scope of wage protection laws, was performed through the elaboration
of doctrine by the judiciary and is important in its own right. Second, for
reasons that are suggested below, during this period disputes over the extent
of director liability for unpaid workers' wages were largely confined to the
courtroom, and attracted little if any public discussion, thus leaving the ju-
diciary with a free hand. The fourth section addresses the continuing effect
of this inversion in a more recent controversy that first arose in the 1980s
over directors' liability for unpaid termination and severance pay, typically
the greatest part of what is owed to workers when corporations default.
Here again the focus is on doctrinal developments set against the broader
socio-economic context. The conclusion discusses the implications of the
judicial inversion both for current debates over directors' liability and for the
recurring dilemma of negotiating worker protection in regimes of capitalist
legality.
II. The Origins of Limited Liability and Shareholder/Director
Liability for Unpaid Workers' Wages
The notion that a group of investors should be able to pool their capital
into a legal entity that is distinct from them and only be individually li-
able to the extent of their personal investment is so broadly accepted today
that those who challenge it face an uphill battlef But this was not always
5. For a critique of limited shareholder liability, see Harry J. Glasbeek, Wealth by Stealth:
Corporate Crime, Corporate Law and the Perversion of Democracy (Toronto: Between the
Lines, 2002). For arguments in favour of modest reforms, see Henry Hansmann and Reiner
Kraakman, "Towards Unlimited Liability for Corporate Torts," Yale Law Journal 100 (1991):
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the case. Indeed, the early nineteenth-century history of the corporation
shows that the idea of a complete separation between the company and its
members took a long while to gain acceptance and that the fight to limit
shareholders' liability exclusively to their initial investment was a pro-
tracted and difficult one. Incorporation and limited liability for shareholders
were, after all, privileges granted by the state, which exempted individuals
from the norm of personal responsibility for their actions and debts, even
when acting in concert with others. 6 As such, compelling public policy
justifications had to be offered before the state granted such extraordinary
privileges to private individuals. In this context, it also seemed eminently
fair for the state to adopt measures reducing the risks limited liability posed
for various groups who dealt with corporations.7 It was out of these early
struggles that shareholder and then director liability for unpaid workers'
wages emerged as a compromise that legitimated the widespread avail-
ability of limited liability.
English and American Influences
The story of the development of the corporate form, limited liability, and
liability for workers' wages in Canada begins in England, but shifts to the
United States by 1800. In England prior to the mid-to-late nineteenth cen-
tury, joint business endeavors were primarily pursued through partnerships
and joint stock companies. Neither of these business associations enjoyed
corporate status and, as a result, its members were jointly and severally
liable for its debts, including of course unpaid workers' wages. Incorpora-
tion was a privilege that could only be obtained at great expense by Royal
Charter or special act of Parliament and was rarely granted.8
1879-1934 (supporting shareholder liability to involuntary creditors) and Paul Halpern,
Michael Trebilcock, and Stuart Turnbull, "An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in
Corporation Law," University of Toronto Law Journal 30 (1980): 117-50 at 149-50 (ap-
proving director liability for workers' wages).
6. The legal basis of the limited liability of directors to third parties for the debts of the
corporation is distinct from that of shareholders, rooted in the law of agency. We return to
this issue below in the discussion of the substitution of director for shareholder liability in
Canada in the 1860s.
7. For a useful overview, see David Millon, "Theories of the Corporation," Duke Law
Journal [1990] (1990): 201-62 at 205-11. This article does not address the mechanisms
for the protection of non-wage-earning creditors. These have been extensively discussed
in the literature on the history of the corporation. For example, see James Willard Hurst,
The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-1970
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1970), 51-53.
8. Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000); Paddy Ireland, "Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company Share
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British North American colonies essentially followed English practice
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. For the most part, this
meant that business associations generally carried on without becoming
incorporated and without the benefit of limited liability. Limited liability
corporations were almost exclusively created to carry out public purposes,
such as the construction and operation of public utilities, including roads,
bridges, banks, water and gas works, piers and railways. R. C. B. Risk es-
timated that in Upper Canada prior to 1841 approximately sixty businesses
were incorporated by special statute. Nearly all delegated public power to
private organizations for the construction and management of public utili-
ties. Similarly, in Nova Scotia the majority of the fifty-four corporations
created up to 1850 were for public utilities.9
In the United States a similar pattern prevailed in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries; nearly all incorporations were by special
statute for the purpose of providing public utilities.'1 Public acceptance
of limited liability for companies providing public utilities, however, did
not easily extend to private business ventures. For example, the 1797 New
York act incorporating the Hamilton Manufacturing Society provided for
full shareholder liability and in 1809 the Massachusetts legislature adopted
the policy of making shareholders in all industrial corporations personally
liable to creditors. Full shareholder liability, however, was short-lived, and
within a few years most American states adopted a policy of double liabil-
ity. For example, New York's general incorporation statute for manufactur-
ing (1811) made shareholders liable for debts owed by the corporation at
the time of its dissolution to an amount equal to the value of their initial
and the Emergence of the Modem Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality," Legal History
17.1 (1996): 40-73 at 42-43; Michael Lobban, "Corporate Identity and Limited Liability in
France and England 1825-67," Anglo-American Law Review 25 (1996): 397-440 at 399-403;
Tom Hadden, Company Law and Capitalism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972),
4-17.
9. R. C. B. Risk, "The Nineteenth-Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in
Ontario,' University of Toronto Law Journal 23 (1973): 270-306, at 271-73; BarbaraA. M.
Patton, "From State Action to Private Profit: The Emergence of the Business Corporation
in Nova Scotia, 1796-1883," Nova Scotia Historical Review 16.1 (1996): 21-60 at 32-33;
Jonathan H. Davidson, "Industry and the Development of Company Law in Nineteenth-
Century Nova Scotia," Nova Scotia Historical Review 15.2 (1995): 88-114. Also, see F. E.
Labrie and E. E. Palmer, "The Pre-Confederation History of Corporations in Canada," in
Studies in Canadian Company Law, ed. Jacob Ziegel (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967), 42-53
and A. W. Currie, "The First Dominion Companies Act," Canadian Journal of Economics
and Political Science 28 (1962): 387-404.
10. Joseph S. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations (Boston:
Harvard University Press, 1917), 106, 317; Hurst, Legitimacy of the Business Corporation,
27; Roy, Socializing Capital, 45-50.
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investment (double liability), as did New Jersey in 1816. Massachusetts,
however, retained unlimited liability until 1830."
The debate around limited liability was reignited and intensified in the
1820s and continued through the 1840s as part of a larger political de-
bate over the legitimacy of the corporation. Broadly speaking, opposition
came from two groups. 2 The first, which included some Whigs and liberal
Democrats, was mostly concerned about the dangers of monopolization
and fraud. One fear was that charters would grant corporations exclusive
rights to engage in a business, and that private interests would corrupt the
legislative process so that only individuals with political sway could obtain
the benefits of incorporation and limited liability. Supporters of limited
liability met this concern by making incorporation more freely available
through the enactment of general incorporation statutes that allowed any
group of investors to incorporate by following simple procedures. 3 A sec-
ond concern of this group was that corporations would defraud creditors
by misrepresenting the amount of capital actually subscribed. This concern
was addressed by legislative measures that held shareholders personally
liable for part of the corporate debt until their shares were fully paid up
and by creating greater transparency, for example, by requiring corporate
officers to publish annual reports disclosing the corporation's financial
situation. With these protections in place, corporations were viewed as a
valuable instrument that facilitated investment in riskier and more capital-
intensive enterprises. 14
The second group of opponents articulated a more radical critique of the
corporate form rooted in producer republicanism. This was an ideology
embraced by farmers, small business operators, and artisans who were
united in the defense of independent artisan and commodity production
against the growth of capitalist enterprise, characterized by the creation of
a permanent working class and concentrations of wealth and power. From
11. Charles M. Haar, "Legislative Regulation of New York Industrial Corporations, 1800-
1850," New York History 22 (1941): 191-207 at 194-95; Edward Merrick Dodd, American
Business Corporations until 1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1954), 370-71; John
W. Cadman, The Corporation in New Jersey: Business and Politics, 1791-1875 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1949), 344; Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law,
1836-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 49-55. For one of the earliest
discussions of the issue, see Joseph K. Angell and Samuel Ames, A Treatise on the Law of
Private Corporations Aggregate (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, Little & Wilkins, 1832, reproduced
New York: Arno Press, 1972), 357-64.
12. Roy, Socializing Capital, 46.
13. L. Ray Gunn, The Decline of Authority (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989),
222-45.
14. Hurst, Legitimacy of the Business Corporation, 33; Hovenkamp, Enterprise, 51; Cad-
man, Corporation, 345-56.
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their perspective, corporations and limited shareholder liability served
as a vehicle that enabled privileged groups to gain unfair advantage over
ordinary individuals. As a result, making the corporate form and limited
liability more widely available and providing for greater financial transpar-
ency were not adequate responses. 5
In the contest between liberals and radicals, the former generally pre-
vailed. For example, in 1828 New York adopted complete limited liability
for shareholders once the whole amount of the capital had been paid in.
Massachusetts followed suit in 1830, while in New Jersey the majority
of charters granted to manufacturing companies between 1824 and 1834
made no provision for shareholder liability. 16
Agitation for greater creditor protection renewed in the early 1840s, as
the economy recovered from the economic panic of 1837 and the pace of
business incorporation increased. For example, in New York double liability
became the norm again in 1844.' 7 In 1846 a New York State senate com-
mittee examined the larger policy questions that had been percolating just
beneath the surface. The chair of the committee and author of its report
was Thomas Barlow, a lawyer and a judge of the court of common pleas in
Madison County, in central New York.' 8 Barlow noted that popular opinion
was growing against special incorporation and "in favor of imposing such
liability upon all stockholders, as shall render the corporation safe as to
the interests of creditors .... ,9 Barlow's report largely reflected the pro-
ducerist position. First, it identified the danger posed by the concentration
of wealth: "The accumulation of wealth is a concentration of power, in all
practical affairs, and bears oppressively against the interests of those of
limited means, devoted to the same business purposes, and such concentra-
tion should not be created by law, unless some resulting benefits will be
realized to the people, paramount to the evil."20
While the encouragement of manufacturing and industrial pursuits that
required concentrations of capital was a legitimate reason for granting the
privilege of corporate status, it did not justify limited liability. "Men cannot
15. Tony A. Freyer, Producers versus Capitalists: Constitutional Conflict in Antebellum
America (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 1-14; Sean Wilentz, Chants
Democratic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
16. Haar, "Legislative Regulation," 196; Hovenkamp, Enterprise, 51; Cadman, Corpora-
tion, 345.
17. New York State Senate, Report, No. 143 (22 November 1847), 9. The double liability
provision became known as the Oriskany clause, named after the manufacturing corporation
whose charter renewal application set the new standard.
18. On Barlow, see http://www.barlowgenealogy.com/Politics/index.html (5 March 2007).
19. New York State Senate Report of the committee on manufactures, on petitions for the
incorporation of manufacturing companies, No. 13 (19 January 1846), 1.
20. Ibid., 2.
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be allowed to escape their obligations in this manner; for if they could,
an aristocracy of wealth and means would spring into existence at once,
bearing omnipotent sway to the ruin, beggary and slavery of thousands of
our industrious mechanics and laborers."'" The report recommended that
charters be granted "stripped and naked of the favored feature of exemption
from just responsibility, and imposing individual personal liability for all
debts incurred; thus assimilating bodies corporate to voluntary associations,
justifiable and responsible in the ordinary business affairs of men."
22
The issue of incorporation was considered at length during the 1846 New
York State constitutional convention. One reason for calling the convention
was widespread concern over the scope of government involvement in the
economy and many of its reforms aimed to curtail the legislature's power
to distribute public largess to private interests." Consistent with that goal,
the standing committee on corporations proposed a constitutional provision
prohibiting special incorporations but permitting the enactment of general
incorporation statutes. A modified version of that resolution was accepted
after lengthy debate.24 While there was widespread support for general
incorporation laws, the issue of limited shareholder liability was more
divisive. Initially the convention voted to entrench unlimited proportional
shareholder liability, but the issue was re-opened and a majority of the
convention delegates were convinced that it was best to leave the matter
to the legislature. As a result, the constitution specified that "[d]ues from
corporations shall be secured by such individual liability of the corporators,
and other means prescribed by law."25
21. Ibid., 3.
22. Ibid., 4.
23. Gunn, Decline of Authority, 170-97 and "Antebellum Society and Politics (1825-
1860)" in The Empire State, ed. Milton M. Klein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001),
390-93; Peter J. Galie, Ordered Liberty: A Constitutional History of New York (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1996), 95-116.
24. Charles Z. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York (Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers
Co-operative Publishing, 1906), 2:184-95. According to A. B. Johnson, president of a Utica
bank and a strong supporter of free incorporation, the measure lifted the "demoralizing effect
of legislative attempts to restrain men unnecessarily from promoting their own interests" by
making incorporation readily accessible to all, thereby eliminating the problem of monopoly
and the corruption of the legislative process that was associated with special charters. A. B.
Johnson, "The Legislative History of Corporations in the State of New York, or, The Progress
of Liberal Sentiments," Hunt's Merchants Magazine XXIII (December 1850), 610-14 in
The Government and the Economy, 1785-1861, ed. Carter Goodrich (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1967), 396-405 at 401.
25. New York State Constitution (1846), Art. 8, § 1-2; William G. Bishop and William
H. Attree, eds., Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision
of the Constitution of the State of New York (Albany: Evening Atlas, 1846), 975-79, 1013,
1020-2 1; Lincoln, Constitutional History, 184-95.
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The subsequent 1846 election returned a Whig government, which was
given the task of implementing the new constitution. The senate committee
on manufactures, still chaired by Thomas Barlow, was mandated to consider
the question of general incorporation and its March 1847 report reflected
the producerist critique of the corporation. It began by noting the ambigu-
ity of the constitutional provision, neither imposing full personal liability
nor allowing for personal liability to be dispensed with entirely, which,
therefore, required a consideration of first principles. While recognizing
the great importance of manufacturing to "our prosperity as a people" the
report noted, "[l]abor and the fruits of labor•., constitute the grand capital
of the people as a whole, and the only sources of living and comfort to the
individual constituents of the great community."26 The report then noted
that most stockholders "are not mechanics or manufacturers in fact; they
merely invest their money to profit by the labor and property of others.
... It is difficult for your committee to see upon what principles worthy of
recognition, in an honest business world, a class of men can come forward
and ask the right of employing laborers, and of purchasing and receiving
the property of others, without being required to stand liable and pay fully
for the same."27
Following an exposition on the history of incorporation and limited
liability, the report turned its attention to the evils that would flow from
exonerating capitalists from liability to pay honest debts. "What class shall
be thus favored, in whole or in part? ... Shall it be the farmer, the merchant,
the blacksmith, the day laborer, the lawyer, the doctor, the carpenter, the
mechanic of any kind? No, not any one man, nor men in common, but
the capitalists, and those of all others best able to pay their debts. '28 The
report also rejected the view that limited liability was justified because
shareholders did not personally make the corporations' contracts or incur
its debts.
If they do not do it in person, they do by officers or agents of their own choos-
ing, for whose acts they are justly responsible .... If men are not to be held
responsible for the acts of their agents, then they may submit their business to
others, receive the benefits and avoid all risks.. .Large tears may be dropt in
their advocacy, but they roll from the eyes of the hungry crocodile. In short,
corporate rights are hostile to the very spirit of our institutions, unjust and
oppressive to the rights of individuals.
29
26. New York State Senate, Report on so much of the Constitution as relates to manufac-
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The senate subsequently approved general incorporation legislation that
made shareholders personally liable for the general debts of the corpora-
tion up to an amount equal to their initial investment (double liability) and
that made them personally liable without limit for debts owed to workers
providing service to the corporation.
The stockholders of any company organized under the provisions of this
act, shall be jointly and severally individually liable for all debts that may
be due and owing to all their laborers, servants and apprentices, for services
performed for such corporations. 0
The assembly accepted unlimited shareholder liability for unpaid wages,3'
but rejected personal shareholder liability for other debts once the shares
were fully paid in.
Manufacturing interests and towns in western New York launched a vig-
orous lobbying effort to support the assembly's position, arguing that the
promotion of manufacturing would bring prosperity to New York and that
the proposed law gave small investors the same access to the advantages
of incorporation that previously were only available to the wealthy. The
Albany Argus also emphasized that the law blended the interests of capital
and labor by securing "to the Operative the reward of his labor under every
conceivable contingency."32 Opponents replied that "it will probably be some
time before the producing classes will submit to be so grossly humbugged
as to rally with any great zeal and ardor in favor of the passage of a law to
exempt corporate capitalists from the payment of honest debts."33 The senate
resisted the manufacturers' lobbying 34 and, in the absence of an agreement
with the assembly, no general incorporation statute passed.
The elections of 1848 returned another Whig-dominated state govern-
ment. In his opening address to the legislature, Governor Young called for
the enactment of general incorporation legislation modeled on the assem-
bly's bill. In his view, New York's future prosperity lay with the develop-
ment of industry, "[b]ut that this object can only be obtained under laws
that will invite the investment of capital." The governor, however, also
noted the assembly's "jealous regard for the interests of labor" manifested,
30. New York State Senate, Report, No. 143 (22 Nov. 1847), 17, 19.
31. "The ... principle that they shall be liable to the classes of creditors who from the
nature of the service they render are compelled to give credit until the service is performed,
is founded in justice and sound policy .... New York State Assembly, Report, No. 240 (18
Nov. 1847), 6. Also see New York State Senate, Report, No. 116 (29 September 1847).
32. Albany Argus, 9 October 1847, quoted in Gunn, Decline of Authority, 235.
33. Letter to the editor, E., "The Manufacturing Bill at Oswego," Albany Evening Atlas,
9 October 1847, 2.
34. New York State Senate, Report, No. 143 (22 November 1847), 6-9. Also see Albany
Evening Argus, 19 November 1847, 2 for an account of the assembly debate.
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inter alia, in the wage liability provision.35 Later that term, the assembly's
version of the general incorporation act passed with little opposition. The
principle of full limited shareholder liability was embraced, except in the
case of workers' wages.36
The Canadian Debate
Republicanism did not hold the same sway in Canada as it did in the United
States. Nevertheless, strains of a producerist worldview resonated in the
discourse of political reformers in the early decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury. For example, William Lyon Mackenzie aimed to advance the welfare
of "the people" defined as "the honest yeoman," "the self-respecting hon-
est mechanic," and the "freeman of Upper Canada" in opposition to the
"parasites and sycophants." As Mackenzie became more radicalized in the
1830s, influenced in part by American ideas, he embraced a labor theory of
value and attacked special privileges. Clause 56 of his draft Constitution for
the State of Upper Canada provided: "There shall never be created within
this state any incorporated trading companies, or incorporated companies
with banking powers. Labour is the only means of creating wealth." The
draft Constitution also declared that "in all laws made, or to be made, every
person shall be bound alike, neither shall any ... charter.., confer any
exemptions from the ordinary course of legal proceedings and responsi-
bilities whereunto others are subjected." Thus corporations, and especially
but not exclusively bank corporations, were objectionable because they
involved state conferral of special privileges, including limited liability,
on a select few who were not direct producers of wealth.
3
1
35. Messages from the Governors of New York, Vol. 4, 400, Jan. 4 1848, cited in Ronald E.
Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Corporation, 1784-1855 (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1982), 194. Albany Evening Atlas, 4 January 1848, 2. On the background
to the 1848 election and its results, see Charles W. McCurdy, The Anti-Rent Era in New York
Law and Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 280-81.
36. An Act to authorize the formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining, me-
chanical or chemical purposes, Laws of New York, 1847, Chap. 40. Editorial comment
divided along predictable lines. See "The General Manufacturing Bill," Daily Albany Argus
(12 February 1848), 2 (favorable) and "Individual Liability-Remarks of Senator Hawley,'
Albany Evening Argus (11 February 1848), 2 (unfavorable).
37. Constitution for the State of Upper Canada, quoted in R. A. McKay, "The Political
Ideas of William Lyon Mackenzie," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science
3 (1937): 1-22 at 19. Also, see Lillian F. Gates, "The Decided Policy of William Lyon
Mackenzie," Canadian Historical Review 40 (1959): 185-208; Donald Creighton, The Em-
pire of the St. Lawrence (Toronto: Macmillan, 1956), 278-80. More recent discussions in-
clude Allan Greer, "Historical Roots of Canadian Democracy," Journal of Canadian Studies
34 (1999): 7-26 and Carol Wilton, Popular Politics and Political Culture in Upper Canada,
1800-1850 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000).
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After the defeat of the 1837 rebellions, moderates emerged to lead the
reform movement and focused more narrowly on the achievement of re-
sponsible government than on more radical social and economic change.
Yet, many moderate reformers remained opposed to the extension of limited
liability to private enterprise, a position that was shared by some supporters
of the weak conservative government in power during the mid-1840s. As
J.-M. Fecteau noted, opposition was rooted in the ambiguous relationship
between the corporate form, including the combination of capital it facilitated
and limited liability, and classical liberal principles of free competition and
personal responsibility and was manifest in the debates and actions of the
Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada during the 1840s.38
The decade began with enormous promise and rapid economic growth,
fueled by demand for Canadian wheat and lumber, but ended with a se-
vere economic recession. This led Canadian businessmen and politicians
to seek strategies to promote renewed growth, including industrialization
and the construction of railways.39 The question of access to incorpora-
tion and limited liability, however, remained controversial and the debate
crossed party lines and divided the business community. Its first iteration
arose in the context of special legislation in 1843 to incorporate a company
authorized to carry out fishing and mining activities in the Gaspd region
of Lower Canada. Thomas Aylwin, a lawyer from Lower Canada and a
reformer, raised the concern that the incorporation statute would grant
private British investors monopoly powers, thus enabling them to "lord it
over the whole district, and render the people subservient to its views and
interests," while the Inspector General, Francis Hincks, a moderate reformer
from Upper Canada, objected specifically to the limited liability clause.
Nevertheless, supporters, such as Thomas Merritt, a reform sympathizer
from Upper Canada, won the vote, arguing that in the absence of limited
liability corporations it would be impossible to raise the capital necessary
to develop the country's resources.4 °
38. Jean-Marie Fecteau, "Les 'petites rdpubliques': les compangnies et la mise en place
du droit corporatif modeme au Quebec au milieu du 19e sifcle," Histoire Sociale-Social
History 49 (1992): 35-56 at 45-50. The Province of Canada was formed by uniting Upper
and Lower Canada, which became officially known as Canada West and Canada East. After
Confederation in 1867, the provinces assumed their present names of Ontario and Quebec.
To limit confusion, I use the designation of Upper and Lower Canada when discussing events
in the pre-Confederation period.
39. J. M. S. Careless, The Union of the Canadas (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967),
104-9; A. A. Den Otter, The Philosophy of Railways (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1997), 34-64; R. B. Sullivan, Lecture Delivered before the Mechanics 'Institute of Hamilton
on the Connection between the Agriculture and Manufactures of Canada (Hamilton: Ruthven,
1848).
40. Debates of the Legislative Assembly of United Canada (8 November 1843), 725-29;
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The issue resurfaced in 1845 during lengthy debates over the enactment of
special legislation incorporating two limited liability cotton-manufacturing
companies and a forwarding company in Lower Canada. Proponents of the
cotton-manufacturing bills, such as Lewis Thomas Drummond, a Lower
Canadian politician aligned with the reform opposition, argued that limited
liability was necessary to promote local manufacturing that, among other
benefits, would counter the problem of young girls migrating to factory jobs
in the United States and keep them "within hearing the bell of their native
villages, and within the reach of the vigilance and protection of their parents,"
while opponents, such as Robert Baldwin, the leader of the reform opposition
in Upper Canada, emphasized the principle of individual responsibility and
the need to contain harmful speculation. Both bills passed.4' In the course of
considering the legislation for the forwarding company, witnesses from the
Montreal business community appeared before the assembly. While James
Dean, a director of the company, testified in favor of limited liability, Thomas
Cringan, the vice president of the Montreal Board of Trade, expressed the
view that "it [is] objectionable that any commercial company should be
incorporated without making them liable to the full extent of their means"
and John T. Brondergest, a merchant and former president of the board of
trade, felt that limited liability was necessary in certain cases that directly
benefited the public, such as banks and railways, but should not be granted to
enterprises conducted purely for commerce.42 The bill was withdrawn and a
revised one re-introduced, which provided for triple liability by stockholders
and other securities, but this still did not satisfy opponents and the bill failed
to pass. Another attempt made the following year met the same fate after
an acrimonious debate.43 Given the level of opposition to granting private
entrepreneurs limited liability, a bill introduced that session to incorporate
an Upper Canadian manufacturing company was amended by adopting the
S. Prov. Can. 1843, c. 45, s. 19. There was also a debate about limited liability in bank
charters that focused on the risks to depositors. It was resolved by imposing double liability
on shareholders, initially at the insistence of the Colonial Office. See S. Prov. Can. 1849, c.
84 (no wage liability) and A. B. Jamieson, Chartered Banking in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson
Press, 1957), 7.
41. Debates (20 January 1845), 1005-11; (6 March 1845), 1950-55 (quote at 1954). S.
Prov. Can. 1845, c. 91 & 92. The bills were reserved by the governor, E. G. Metcalfe, on
the ground that they were inconsistent with English policy not to grant corporate status to
enterprises that did not require substantial capital, but the Colonial Office took no action
on the ground that the resulting inconvenience would be too great, especially given that
the matter had been already considered locally. See Fecteau, "Les 'petites rdpubliques,"'
52-53. More generally on debates over limited liability in Canada during this period, see
Risk, "Nineteenth-Century Foundations," 295-98.
42. Debates (3 March 1845), 1856-58.
43. Debates (5 March 1845), 1940-41, (28 April 1846), 1016-18.
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Quebec civil law partnership en commandite arrangement, which allowed
for quiet investors to be liable only to the extent of their investment, while
leaving active partners-the directors-personally liable for the debts of the
partnership. Although some members remained opposed to this compromise
arrangement, the bill easily passed."a
In 1847 several bills were introduced to incorporate limited liability
mining companies, sparking yet another round of debate. Robert Baldwin
endorsed "the old fashioned principle that men were bound in conscience,
and ought to be bound in law to pay all their debts," but the majority of the
Tory-dominated assembly accepted the judgment of William Boulton, a
Toronto Tory lawyer and prominent Orangeman, that the denial of limited
liability to corporations "'would discourage the investment of capital, in the
country ... that it was an antideluvian (sic) doctrine altogether."45 Still,
views on the issue crossed party lines. Later that session, for example,
a general partnerships bill for manufacturing companies that provided
for limited liability was withdrawn after the Upper Canadian government
leader, Henry Sherwood, a prominent Tory, objected, stating that while he
was in favor of "liberal legislation in matters of commerce" he was "not
in favour of extending liberality so far as to excuse persons from paying
their debts. This Bill went beyond liberality. It out heroded Herod.
'4 6
The 1847-48 elections returned a Reform government, jointly led by
Baldwin and Louis-Hippolyte La Fontaine from Lower Canada. The issue
of limited liability arose again in an 1849 debate over the incorporation of
a Lower Canadian warehousing company. Henry Sherwood reiterated his
objection to limited liability in the absence of compelling reasons for grant-
ing it. He feared that if the assembly approved limited liability in this case,
it would soon become the norm for business. Robert Baldwin expressed
similar concerns. "Charters might be necessary in some cases, but unless
a stop were put to it, there would be nothing but Corporations from one
end of the country to the other." Supporters of the bill, such as William
Buell Richards, a reformer and close friend of Richard Baldwin, pointed
to the success of New York warehouses, which enjoyed limited liability.
The Inspector General, Francis Hincks, was also opposed to limited liabil-
44. Debates (14 May 1846), 1451-52. S. Prov. Can. 1846, c. 94, s. 14. One Upper Ca-
nadian reform newspaper, The Examiner, opposed this compromise, in part based on a
misunderstanding of the extent of directors' liability, but more fundamentally because of
their radical reform outlook that associated the rise of corporations with the creation of a
situation in which "labour becomes subservient to capital" and "the few are privileged and
the many wronged." The Examiner, "The Personal Liability Principle," (20 May 1846), 2
(quote), and "Individual Liability," (27 May 1846), 2.
45. Debates (16 July 1847), 1083. S. Prov. Can. 1847, c. 69, 70, 71 & 72.
46. Debates (24 July 1847), 1125. Also, see The Examiner, 21 July 1847, 2.
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ity, but offered as a compromise the commandite principle. This granted
limited liability to shareholders but made directors personally liable to the
full extent of their property. This was acceptable to all concerned.
47
Later that session, the Legislative Council, the appointed branch of the
legislature, adopted a general incorporation bill for manufacturing, mining,
mechanical, and chemical concerns, modeled on the recent New York stat-
ute, and referred it to the assembly for its approval. The bill provided that
shareholders were personally liable for debts of the corporation until their
stock was paid up, but afterwards their liability was limited to their invest-
ment, with one exception: as in New York shareholders remained personally
liable for unpaid servants' wages. The bill faced considerable opposition
from those who objected to the extension of limited liability and although
it received three readings, the motion to declare that the bill passed was put
over for further debate. In the interim, the bill was lost when the Parliament
buildings were burned down over the Rebellion Losses bill and the assembly
was prorogued before further action could be taken.48
The issue came before the Legislative Assembly the following year, but
the lapse of time had not changed anyone's views. Francis Hincks spoke of
the unfairness of allowing small capitalists to enter into competition with
mechanics when they were relieved of responsibility for their debts while
mechanics were not, and Henry Sherwood insisted that active managers
should be held responsible for the corporation's liabilities, while supporters
of the legislation pointed to its beneficial effects in promoting prosper-
ity in the United States. The bill passed, including the provision making
shareholders personally liable "for all debts that may be due and owing
to all or any of the laborers, servants and apprentices thereof, for services
performed for such Company." Personal liability, however, only arose after
a judgment obtained against the company could not be executed.49 The
47. Debates (15 March 1849), 1347-49. S. Prov. Can., c. 192, s. 3, 4. Later that session
the legislature passed without debate a statute providing for the creation of limited partner-
ships in Upper Canada. S. Prov. Can. 1849, c. 75. It followed the commandite principle,
limiting the liability of passive investors to the amount of their investment, but keeping
active partners personally liable for the debts of the partnership.
48. Debates (9, 16 & 18 April 1849), 1788-90, 1895, 1956; Journals of the Legislative
Assembly of the Province of Canada (10 May 1849), 287; Currie, "First Dominion," 391.
That session two general incorporation statutes were passed for companies engaged in the
construction of roads, bridges, piers, and wharves but neither provided for stockholder li-
ability. See S. Prov. Can. 1849, c. 56 & 84. As well, a limited partnership statute for Upper
Canada was passed that permitted partnerships with general partners, who were personally
liable for the partnership's liabilities, and special partners who were not. See S. Prov. Can.
1849, c. 75.
49. Debates (10 & 27 June, 15, 22 & 24 July 1850), 464-67, 1204-5; Currie, "First
Dominion," 391-93; S. Prov. Canada, 1850, c. 28, s. 11.
Liability for Unpaid Wages in Canada 73
enactment of this statute effectively put to an end parliamentary debate
over the principle of limited liability,50 and radical populists, who became
known as the Clear Grits, turned their attention to other matters.5'
The Canadian economy entered into a period of strong growth in the
1850s, fueled by the rising demand for Canadian staples and the rapid
expansion of the railway network. As well, Canadian manufacturing also
began to make advances in textiles, agricultural implements, and wood-
working.2 Prior to Confederation in 1867, however, only a small minority
of businesses adopted a corporate form, mostly in the areas of transportation
and finance. These activities were not covered by the general incorporation
statute of 1850, which initially could be used to create companies engaged
in manufacturing, ship building, mining, or the mechanical and chemical
business.5 Entrepreneurs carrying on covered activities, however, were
not compelled to incorporate under the general act and could and, indeed,
did seek to incorporate through special acts of the legislature, as of course
did those engaged in businesses outside the scope of the act. A complete
survey of these special incorporation statutes has not been conducted, but
a sampling indicates that railway and steamship companies were typically
incorporated without provision for personal liability for unpaid workers'
wages, while mining and manufacturing statutes either made no provision
for personal liability or made directors liable for unpaid workers' wages.
54
50. There was a confused debate in 1855 over a bill to incorporate the Montreal Locomo-
tive Manufacturing Company. A number of members objected to limited liability because
the objects of the company were broadly defined so as to allow it to compete with small
producers who lacked this protection. The matter was resolved by limiting the company's
area of business. No provision was made for either shareholder or director liability for
workers' wages. See Debates (12 April 1855), 2745-47; S. Prov. Canada 1855, c 221.
51. Careless, Union, 166-84; "Our Platform," The North American (3 January 1851), 2.
52. Careless, Union, 132-49; John McCallum, Unequal Beginnings: Agriculture and
Economic Development in Quebec and Ontario until 1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1980); Graham D. Taylor and Peter A. Baskerville, A Concise History of Business in
Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994), 170-85.
53. For data on incorporation in Upper Canada, see Risk, "Nineteenth-Century Foundations,"
304-5. The scope of the general incorporation statute was expanded over the decade to include,
among others, public hotels, the supply of gas and water, road construction, timberworks, and
fishing. See S. Prov. Can. 1853, c. 122, 124, 190, 191; S. Prov. Can. 1858, c. 90.
54. For example, the Montreal and Kingston Railway Co. (S. Prov. Canada 1851, c. 143),
the Montreal Ocean Steamship Co. (S. Prov. Can. 1854, c. 44), and the Collingwood Cotton
Manufacturing Co. (S. Prov. Can. 1859, c. 110) made no provision for personal liability,
while the Megantic Mining Co. (S. Prov. Can. 1854, c. 49) and the Shipton Slate Works Co.
(S. Prov. Can. 1854, c. 53) made directors personally liable for unpaid workers' wages. A
number of general incorporation statutes for public utilities were also enacted in the 18 50s,
none of which included director or shareholder liability for workers' wages. For example,
see S. Prov. Can. 1852, c. 10 (telegraphs); S. Prov. Can. 1853, c. 124 (harbors), c. 173 (gas
and water works), c. 190 (river improvements).
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Shareholders were rarely made liable for unpaid workers' wages in special
incorporation statutes."
The shift from shareholder to director liability was strengthened by an
1860 statute that allowed industries covered by the existing general incor-
poration scheme to also incorporate by judicial decree and again by an
1861 statute that standardized the terms under which covered industries
became incorporated by special statute. Indeed, that statute also reinforced
wage protection by making director liability for unpaid workers' wages a
standard term of future special incorporation statutes at a time when legis-
lative practice varied considerably.56 One blip in this picture was the 1864
statute that created a procedure for incorporation by letters patent, which
made no provision for personal liability for workers' wages. This omission,
however, seems to have been an oversight rather than a conscious change
of policy since director liability for unpaid workers' wages was included
when the letters patent regime was adopted five years later in the first post-
confederation Canadian general incorporation statute.
57
Research to date has not uncovered any discussion of the switch from
shareholder to director liability during this period. Christopher Dunkin, a
Conservative lawyer elected to represent a riding in the Eastern Townships
of Lower Canada, introduced the 1860 and 1861 general incorporation stat-
utes providing for director liability, but there is no record of any legislative
debate or of his motivations. 58 Hence we are largely left to speculate both as
to the reasons for the switch and for the apparent absence of any controversy
over the change. For those concerned about the unfairness of allowing some
businesses to operate without responsibility for their debts, it is probably
safe to presume that they cared little about whether it was shareholders or
directors who were held personally responsible, as long as some corporate
actors were. The 1850 statute was modeled on the New York State law,
55. For example, see S. Prov. Can. 1851, c. 64. For an overview of liability provisions,
as well as a table that breaks down incorporations in Upper Canada prior to 1867 by year,
industry, and type of incorporation, see Risk, "Nineteenth-Century Foundations," 295-98,
304-5.
56. S. Prov. Can. 1860, c. 31, ss. 47, 48, and 53; S. Prov. Can .1861, c. 18, ss. 33, 34,
and 39. For a discussion of these changes and the uncertainty surrounding the motivation,
see Currie, "First Dominion," 396-98.
57. S. Prov. Can. 1864, c. 23; S.C. 1869, c. 13. Director liability for workers' wages was
also made a standard term of post-confederation Canadian special incorporation statutes.
S.C. 1869, c. 12.
58. On Dunkin, see entry in Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online http://www
.biographi.ca/EN/index.html (5 March 2007). Previous researchers have noted the dearth of
materials on the background to these various incorporation statutes. For example, see Cur-
rie, "First Dominion," 396-98; F. W. Wegenast, The Law of Canadian Companies (Toronto:
Burroughs, 1931), 21.
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which contained shareholder liability, and so that is why shareholder li-
ability was first adopted. However, as noted, earlier legislation had adopted
the limited partnership model in which managing partners were personally
responsible for the debts of the partnership, an arrangement that also satisfied
the opponents of limited liability incorporation. Moreover, it was a notable
feature of all of these incorporation statutes that directors were required to
be shareholders, 59 and so director liability for unpaid workers wages simply
meant placing personal responsibility for unpaid workers' wages on the
shoulders of the sub-set of shareholders who managed the corporation.
This provides a plausible explanation for the absence of opposition to the
shift from shareholder to director responsibility for unpaid workers' wages.
In addition, it accounts for why it occurred. Given that the practice of
holding directors liable for unpaid workers wages had become widespread
in special incorporation statutes for mining and manufacturing companies
and was later adopted in general incorporation statutes for private industry,
it is fair to assume that incorporators and their lawyers were either indif-
ferent between shareholder and director liability, and merely followed a
precedent once it was set, or that they actively preferred director liability to
shareholder liability. The problem with the first scenario is that the default
statutory position after 1850 was shareholder liability and so we would
need to determine how and when the precedent subsequently and uninten-
tionally changed. It is more probable that director liability was preferred
for a number of reasons, the most important likely being that it facilitated
the participation of passive investors in the corporation by limiting their
liability to the amount of their initial investment. While this may not have
been a major concern for the family controlled firms that predominated in
most of the sectors covered by the 1850 legislation and its extensions, it
would have been for the small minority of large companies that hoped to
raise capital through the sale of shares to outside investors.
60
A second and related but more abstract consideration may have been
that shareholder liability was viewed as less consistent with the principle
that the corporation had a distinct legal personality from that of its own-
ers than was director liability. This principle had no basis in common law
but had to be created by statute, including the grant of limited liability to
shareholders. 6' The immunity of directors, however, was rooted in the com-
59. S. Prov. Can. 1850, c. 28, s. 4; S. Prov. Can. 1860, c. 31, s. 18; S. Prov. Can. 1861,
c. 18, s. 9.
60. On the predominance of small firms and the slow growth of the Canadian securities
market during this period, see Taylor and Baskerville, Concise History, 181-85, 217-25 and
Ranald C. Michie, "The Canadian Securities Market, 1850-1914," Business History Review
62 (1988): 35-73.
61. It should be noted, however, that by virtue of the 1849 Interpretation Act, limited
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mon law of agency insofar as directors were construed as agents and not as
principals of the corporation. Indeed, incorporation statutes did not grant
directors limited liability, but rather imposed personal liability on directors
for a variety of actions that harmed creditors' interests. Thus the imposition
of director liability for unpaid workers' wages was an incremental addition
to a regime that already recognized the legitimacy of holding directors
personally liable for some actions of the corporation.6 2 In short, while
incorporators presumably would have preferred no personal liability for
unpaid workers' wages, they operated in a political environment in which
that option was not usually available to private enterprise. Therefore, they
settled on directors' liability as being marginally preferable to shareholder
liability. In any event, director liability became the norm in most pre- and
post-Confederation private enterprise incorporation statutes.
63
In sum, at least until the mid-century the principle that shareholders
were entirely separate from the corporation and should not be responsible
for its debts was not fully accepted. Incorporation with limited liability for
investors was still considered a privilege granted by the state to promote
public purposes. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, legislators were
liability was enjoyed by all corporations unless express exception were made. See S. Prov.
Can. 1849, c. 10, s. 5(24). This did not change the practice of making express provision for
limited shareholder liability in both general and special incorporation statutes.
62. The distinct legal foundations of limited liability for shareholders and directors' li-
ability was one that was not always clearly recognized and is still often overlooked in current
jurisprudence and debates. See Robert Flannigan, "The Personal Tort Liability of Directors,"
Canadian Bar Review 81 (2002): 247-322 at 248. For an example of director liability, see
S. Prov. Can. 1850, c. 28, s. 14 (paying dividends out of capital).
63. For example, see S.Q. 1868, c. 25, s. 48; S.C. 1869, c. 12, s. 40; S.C. 1869, c. 13;
S.O. 1874, s. 52; S.M. 1875, c. 28, s. 52; Companies Ordinance, N.W.T. 1901, c. 20, s. 54,
S.S. 1915, c. 14, s. 103. The issue of limited liability corporations also arose in Nova Scotia.
Early reformers Joseph Howe and William Young unsuccessfully opposed limited shareholder
liability for banking corporations in the 1830s, but it became increasingly common for the
legislature to insert some form of shareholder liability into incorporation acts passed during
the 1830s and 1840s. In 1851 Nova Scotia enacted a limited partnerships act based on the
commandite principle (R.S.N.S. 1851, c. 79), but the general incorporation statute, passed
the same year, made no provision for limited investor liability (R.S.N.S. 1851, c. 87). In
S.N.S. 1862, c. 2, the principle of double liability was adopted, but even this form of limited
liability was omitted in its general incorporation act of 1873 (S.N.S. 1873, c. 13). Full lim-
ited liability for shareholders only became a permanent feature of Nova Scotia corporation
law in 1883 and was accompanied by director liability for unpaid workers' wages (S.N.S.
1883, c. 24, s. 69). Special incorporation statutes, however, contained a variety of liability
provisions. The 1883 act was not repealed, but a footnote to the 1900 Revised Statute Act
stated that it was effectively superseded by the chapter "of Joint Stock Companies" published
as R.S.N.S. 1900, c. 128. For discussion of nineteenth-century developments, see Patton,
"From State Action" and Davidson, "Industry and the Development."
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increasingly accepting the view that it was justifiable to grant this privilege
to private entrepreneurs because it facilitated investment in capital-intensive
enterprises. Nevertheless, they also recognized that servants were not in a
position to protect themselves contractually against the risk of non-payment
of wages, especially since master and servant law still compelled them to
provide service on penalty of prosecution. 6' In these circumstances, mak-
ing shareholders or directors personally responsible for unpaid workers'
wages owed by the corporation was adopted as a condition of granting
limited liability to private investors in for-profit corporations. The switch
to director liability may have reflected a change in view about the appro-
priate allocation of responsibility within the corporation, but not about
the principle that workers' wages must the protected by the imposition of
personal liability on some set of corporate actors.
65
III. From Condition to Exception: Judicial Subordination of Wage
Protection to the Norm of Limited Liability, Round 1
The understanding that shareholder or director liability for unpaid workers'
wages was a condition of the statutory grant of the privilege of limited li-
ability to for-profit corporations was, for the most part, lost or ignored by the
judiciary when it came to interpret the legislation. Instead, judges constructed
an inverted view of that relationship, making limited liability the dominant
legal norm and shareholder or director liability for workers wages an ex-
ceptional privilege to be narrowly construed. This inversion, however, was
neither immediate nor total. A minority of judges gave priority to workers'
wage claims and this produced some controversy and inconsistency.
The conflict between wage protection and limited liability primarily
played itself out in a series of cases that raised the question of the per-
sonal scope of wage protection. 66 This was a problem because employ-
ment statutes in the nineteenth and often continuing into the twentieth
centuries were written in the idiom of master and servant law, repeating
64. Indeed, in 1847 the government enacted a master and servant statute applicable in
Upper Canada to make it clear that workers could be prosecuted and punished for breaching
their contracts. S. Prov. Can. 1847, c. 23; Paul Craven, "The Law of Master and Servant in
Mid-Nineteenth Century Ontario," in Essays in the History of Canadian Law, ed. David H.
Flaherty (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1981), 1:175-211.
65. Banking corporations were an exception, as well some corporations providing public
utilities. For example, see S. Prov. Canada 1850, c. 21 (banking); S. Prov. Can. 1853, c. 173
(gas and water). Also see Labrie and Palmer, "Pre-Confederation History," 53-60.
66. A second issue was the technical preconditions that had to be satisfied before share-
holders or directors could be held liable.
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its classification of service providers. The New York general incorporation
statute was typical. It extended wage protection to "laborers, servants and
apprentices." This language was copied in pre- and post-confederation
Canadian general incorporation statutes and was later modified in federal
and some provincial statutes by the addition of "clerks" to this list. 67 It is
unclear, however, to what extent legislators were cognizant of the traditional
meaning of these categories. For example, in 1847 the Province of Canada
enacted a local master and servant law for Upper Canada after a judicial
decision cast doubt on whether the relevant English law had been received
in the colony. That act applied to "servants and labourers. '6 Questions
were subsequently raised about whether the law covered skilled workers
and to remove any doubt the statute was amended in 1855 to specify that
it applied to "journeymen or skilled labourers in any trade, calling, craft
or employment."
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As the above example indicates, the development of a unified legal cat-
egory of "employee" and of a general concept of a contract of employment
followed a slow and tortuous path, as the content and social underpinnings
of master and servant law were being transformed. Between 1850 and 1920,
Canada and Ontario in particular underwent two industrial revolutions.
The first was characterized by the growth of factory production, which
entailed large concentrations of workers, mechanization, and a more refined
division of labor, while the second was marked by the concentration of
ownership in large corporations, the development of mass production tech-
niques with a reduction in the dependence of skilled labor, and increased
managerial control over production.7" As a result, in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries it was increasingly difficult to determine the legal
meaning of traditional master and servant categories. In England, where
the hold of master and servant law was arguably greater than in British
North America,7 courts were often confronted with the question of the
personal scope of both disciplinary and protective legislation that invoked
its categories. According to Simon Deakin, the outcome was commonly
67. S.C. 1877, c. 43, s. 69. The Act also reduced director liability from one year to six
months' wages. This language was used in the Northwest Territories legislation (N.W.T.
1901, c. 20, s. 54) and kept in the subsequent Alberta legislation.
68. S. Prov. Can. 1847, c. 23, s. 1.
69. S. Prov. Can. 1855, c. 136.
70. Gregory S. Kealey, Toronto Workers Respond to Industrial Capitalism, 1867-1892
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 18-34; Brian D. Palmer, Working-Class Ex-
perience (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), 81-87, 117-21, 155-63; Craig Heron,
"The Second Industrial Revolution in Canada, 1890-1930," in Class, Community and the
Labour Movement: Wales and Canada 1850-1930, ed. Deian R. Hopkins and Gregory S.
Kealey (Wales: LLAFUR/CCLH, 1989), 48-66.
71. On England, see Douglas Hay, "England," and "Master and Servant in England,' in
Private Law and Social Inequality in the Industrial Age, ed. Willibald Steinmetz (Oxford:
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determined on the basis of the type of legislation and the view of the judges
of its appropriate scope.
7
1
Disputes over the coverage of employment legislation were neither as per-
vasive nor severe in the United States and Canada as they were in England,
but the issue grew in importance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Indeed, in 1908 C. B. Labatt, the associate editor of the Canada
Law Journal and the author of a three-volume treatise on Anglo-American
master and servant law published in 1904, wrote a lengthy article on the
scope of wage protection statutes, in which he described the state of the
decisions as "extremely conflicting."73 When faced with the interpretation
of such provisions, the courts had a choice of interpretive starting points.
To greatly simplify, on the one hand, they could resort to rules of statu-
tory interpretation to help resolve ambiguities. The problem, however, was
that judges faced a choice from among a number of inconsistent rules. For
example, as Labatt noted, judges could either adopt the rule of noscitur
a sociis according to which a general word was to be read restrictively if
it appeared in a phrase surrounded by narrower terms, or they could start
from the presumption that each word in a phrase has been used to express
a distinct idea.74 As well, they also had the choice of defining the terms
in relation to increasingly archaic distinctions drawn from English master
and servant law or interpreting them in light of the emerging more general
category of employment. The interpretive choices made by judges, however,
were only partially driven by their preferences among competing canons
of statutory interpretation or views about the meaningfulness of traditional
service categories. At least as important, were two interrelated substantive
differences: first, whether the judge viewed limited liability as a statutory
privilege or as a basic legal norm and, second, whether the judge saw share-
Oxford University Press, 2000), 227-64. On Canada, see Paul Craven, "Canada, 1670-1935:
Symbolic and Instrumental Enforcement in Loyalist North America," in Masters, Servants,
and Magistrates, 175-218.
72. Simon Deakin, "Legal Origins of Wage Labour: The Evolution of the Contract of
Employment from Industrialization to the Welfare State," in The Dynamics of Wage Relations
in the New Europe, ed. Linda Clarke, Peter de Gijsel, and Jirn Janssen (Boston: Kluwer,
2000), 32-43; "The Contract of Employment: A Study of Legal Evolution," Historical
Studies in Industrial Relations 11 (Spring 2001): 1-36. Also see Simon Deakin and Frank
Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch.
2 and Robert J. Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor in the Nineteenth Century
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
73. C. B. Labatt, "What Persons Are Within the Purview of Statutes Affecting the Enforce-
ment of Claims for Services," Canada Law Journal 44 (1908): 369-427, at 370. C. B. Labatt,
Commentaries on the Law of Master and Servant (Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers Cooperative
Publishing, 1904). A greatly expanded second edition was published in 1913.
74. Labatt, "What Persons," 370-71.
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holder or director liability for workers' wages as a penal or as a remedial
provision.
The issue of the coverage of shareholder liability for workers' wages first
arose under the New York law and because that jurisprudence influenced
early Canadian cases it is appropriate to start the analysis there. The earliest
reported decision in New York, Conant v. Van Schaick, took an expansive
view of the statute, holding that the term "servant" included engineers, mas-
ter mechanics, and conductors as well as "the man who shovels gravel."75
The only exceptions were corporate officers and agents. Moreover, the
court also found that the workers' cause of action was assignable. This
facilitated the ability of some merchants who extended credit to workers
to sue when the corporation defaulted on wages. Subsequent decisions
confirmed the exclusion of officers and agents from protection and also
held that shareholders were not liable under the act for debts owed by the
corporation to large and small contractors.76 More controversial was the
status of professional and supervisory employees. In one early case involv-
ing a special incorporation statute that limited shareholder wage liability to
laborers and operatives, the court excluded a professional engineer on the
ground that the law and underlying policy aimed to protect manual laborers,
not professional men who were well qualified to look after themselves.77
This decision was distinguished in subsequent cases involving a working
overseer, bookkeeper, civil engineer, and reporter/assistant editor.78
Judgments in two later cases, however, opted decisively for a narrower
view of the term "servant." The second of those cases, Wakefield v. Fargo,
included a claim by a bookkeeper/general manager. In support of his ar-
gument that the plaintiff did not come within the ambit of the statute,
the lawyer for the shareholders characterized the statutory imposition of
liability for unpaid workers' wages as "a penalty and nothing else" and
argued that the provision should be strictly construed. As well, the lawyer
claimed the statute was "designed to protect persons unable to protect
themselves by reason of the character of the laborer, as a class supposed
75. (1857) 24 Barb. 87 at 99.
76. Richardson v. Abendroth (1864) 43 Barb. 162 held that an officer could sue, but was
overruled by Coffin v. Reynolds (1868) 37 NY Rep. 639. Hill v. Spencer (1874) 61 NY Rep.
274 and Dean v. De Wolf(1878) 16 Hun. 186 (excluding agents); Aikin v. Wasson (1862) 24
NY Rep. 482 (excluding contractors). The distinction between servants or employees and
independent contractors then as now is a difficult one to draw.
77. Ericsson v. Brown (1862) 38 Barb. 390 at 392.
78. Hovey v. Ten Broeck (1865) 3 Rob. 316 (overseer and bookkeeper); Williamson v.
Wadsworth (1867) 49 Barb. 294 (civil engineer); Harris v. Norvell (1876) 1 Abb. N.C 127
(reporter, assistant editor).
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and assumed to be ignorant, careless and weak."79 Danforth, J., speaking
for the court, agreed.
A stockholder is not liable for the general debts of a corporation, if the statute
creating it has been complied with. The clause in question creates a privileged
class, into which none but the humblest employees are admitted.... It is plain
we think, that the services referred to are menial or manual services-that he
who performs them must be of a class whose members usually look to the
reward of a day's labor, or service, for immediate or present support, for whom
the company does not expect credit, and to whom its future ability to pay is of
no consequence; one who is responsible for no independent action, but who
does a day's work, or a stated job under the direction of a superior.8"
Danforth, J. continued with an expostulation on the hierarchy of service
relationships drawn from Blackstone and earlier New York cases. He admit-
ted that the word servant might be read broadly to include all who provide
service "in this instance, from the one who dips or bottles the water, to the
president" but quickly added that "this would manifestly be too general."
He then turned to the other service classifications:
"Laborer or apprentice" are words of limited meaning, and refer to a particular
class of persons employed for a defined and low grade of service .... They
necessarily exclude persons of higher dignity .... A statute which treats of
persons of an inferior rank cannot by any general word be so extended as to
embrace a superior. The word "servant" must be construed by its associates.
It stands between "laborer" and "apprentice," and can represent no higher
degree of employment.
8'
Thus we see a complete inversion of the idea that limited liability is a privi-
lege granted to shareholders on condition that they remain personally re-
sponsible for the payment of workers' wages if the corporation defaults. In
Danforth, J.'s view, wage protection is a privilege only given to a narrowly
defined segment of workers located at the bottom end of an eighteenth-
century hierarchical ordering of service relations. As a practical matter, Dan-
forth, J.'s approach meant that those covered by the statute were unlikely to
benefit from it since the class of protected workers would, by his definition,
not be owed more than a day or two of wages, while skilled, managerial and
professional employees who could benefit from the statute because of the
larger amount of wages paid in arrears were not covered.
82
79. Wakefield v. Fargo et al. (1882) 90 NY 213, at 215. The earlier case, Krauser v. Ruckel
(1879) 17 Hun. 463, disallowed a claim by a superintendent of mine works.
80. Wakefield, ibid., 217-18.
81. Ibid., 219.
82. 1 have not traced the development of New York case law on shareholder liability
beyond Wakefield. However, it is worth noting that Labatt's global assessment of American
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Although business failure was a common occurrence in Canada during
the second half of the nineteenth century, for reasons that are not apparent
there are no reported Canadian cases interpreting wage liability provisions
until the 1890s. 3 Even before cases reached the courts, however, limited
liability was becoming entrenched as a basic legal norm. For instance, by
the time Montreal lawyer Charles Henry Stephens authored a treatise on
joint stock companies in 1881, the idea of limited liability as a privilege
conferred on the condition that workers' wages were protected was so alien
that Stephens thought it would "require some ingenuity to discover" why
directors should be personally liable in respect of wages more than in con-
nection with other matters within the scope of their duties. Fortunately, in
his eyes, their liability was hedged with so many conditions that there would
be very few cases in which directors would be "condemned to pay."
8 4
Stephens's view proved to be correct when the first case on the issue
reached the high courts in 1895. Mr. Welch was engaged as a foreman by
the British America Starch Works to superintend a construction project at
the company's factory in Brantford, Ontario. When the company failed to
pay he sued and obtained judgment, but when the execution was returned
nulla bona, he brought an action against the shareholders. Welch's agree-
ment with the company stipulated that it would employ the men necessary
for the work but that he would pay them out of pocket and be reimbursed
every fortnight. As well, the company agreed to pay him $5.00 a day and
another $2.00 a day for the use of a steam pump he provided. When work
was completed, the company failed to pay $225.55 owing to Welch. He
sued, recovered judgment by default, and, after unsuccessfully attempting
to collect from the company, brought an application against Ellis, a direc-
tor of the corporation. The trial judge held that Welch was not a laborer,
jurisprudence was that it narrowly construed shareholder liability because it was in deroga-
tion of the common law, imposed new liabilities, or was penal in nature. See Labatt, "What
Persons," 407.
83. On the rate of business failure, see Taylor and Baskerville, Concise History 173. In
part the absence of earlier cases may reflect the slow rate at which Canadian entrepreneurs
took advantage of the corporate form, although almost 4,000 firms incorporated in Ontario
between 1867 and 1906. See Fecteau, "Les "petites rfpubliques,"' 53-54 and Michie, "Ca-
nadian Securities," 42. It is possible that there were previous lower court judgments that
went unreported. However, research to date has not identified any discussion of director
liability in any published legal source, apart from Stephens, Law and Practice. See below,
note 84.
84. Charles Henry Stephens, The Law and Practice of Joint Stock Companies under the
Canadian Acts (Toronto: Carswell, 1881), 367-69. He suggested tongue-in-cheek that it
might serve as "a check upon the tendency to make money by the appointment of relations
at good fat salaries"(368). The entire passage is reproduced in C. A. Masten, Canadian
Company Law (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1901), 262.
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servant, or apprentice within the meaning of the statute, and Welch ap-
pealed.
His lawyers argued that the provision in question ought to be broadly con-
strued since it aimed to protect persons who could not protect themselves.
They also argued that the term servant "is as wide a term as can be used to
define a person employed by another."85 Ellis's lawyers countered that Welch
was neither a workman nor a laborer, but rather a contractor who was not
protected by the Act. In the alternative, they submitted that even if Welch
was a servant in the wide sense of the term, its meaning in the statute was
restricted because it was used in conjunction with the terms "laborer" and
"apprentice," thereby connoting an intent to include only servants whose
substantial occupation was the performance of manual labor.
8 6
The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with Ellis's lawyers. Osler, J.A.
noted that the provision was borrowed from the New York statute and then
quoted Wakefield for the proposition that the act only covered servants per-
forming menial or manual services. In the opinion of Osler, J.A., the maxim
noscitur a sociis applied and it did not matter that Welch was paid by the
day. MacLennan, J.A. wrote a concurring opinion that took a purposive
approach to statutory interpretation, albeit one bereft of any historical or
policy analysis. Rather, he asserted, "it is evident to my mind that it was
not intended to give this suretyship to any but the humblest class of wage
earners, the loss of whose wages might be productive of great distress to
themselves and their families." But as the judgment continued, MacLen-
nan, J.A. invoked another policy reason for reading the statute narrowly.
It "cast the burden of suretyship upon persons not otherwise liable; in fact
imposes upon the directors a penal liability for the default of the company,
though they may have been guilty of no wrong whatever."87
The characterization of the act as "penal" did not go unchallenged in
subsequent judgments and it is instructive to explore these differences.
In Ontario, Riddell, J.'s opinion in Lee v. Friedman voiced the strongest
alternative to Welch. That case was not about the scope of coverage, but
rather raised the question of whether there could be an equitable assign-
ment of the wages to a third party who could then recover against directors
if the company failed to pay the workers. In this case, the plaintiff, Lee,
was a local merchant who had made an arrangement with the Wilbur Iron
Ore Co. and its employees whereby he provided goods to the employees
on credit and the employees agreed that the company would deduct the
amounts they owed to Lee from their wages and pay Lee directly. Rid-
85. Welch v. Ellis (1895), 22 O.A.R. 255, at 257.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., 262.
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dell, J. articulated a different interpretive starting point than the one in
Welch:
No doubt from the point of view of the directors, the Act may be somewhat
drastic-but what of the workmen? The Legislature had to face this situation:
when a company fails and does not pay its workmen, are the workmen, who
had nothing to do with the management of the company, and could not know
anything about the company's prosperity, to suffer, or are those who had all to
do with the management, either directly or through the man they appointed,
and who knew or ought to have known all about its financial condition?
The answer given by the Legislature is that the directors must bear some
part of the loss at least-and while it is "penal" as regards the directors, it is
highly remedial as regards the workmen.88
Thus, while Riddell, J. did not challenge the norm of limited liability, he
recognized that it was in conflict with the legislature's remedial purpose of
protecting workers who were unable to protect themselves. In their deci-
sion, the court refused to read narrowly the scope of protection and held
that in the circumstances of this case an equitable assignment had occurred
and that the assignee of the wages could collect against the directors.
This interpretive approach, privileging the remedial thrust of wage pro-
tection over the norm of limited liability, ultimately failed to displace the
strict constructionist approach in Ontario. Subsequent decisions of the
Ontario courts on the issue of assignment distinguished Lee on its facts,89
while those on the scope of employment held that actors and working
managers were not covered. 90 Riddell, J. participated in many of these
later decisions but never again invoked the remedial purpose of the act to
allow wage protection to trump limited liability.9'
88. Lee v. Friedman (1909), 20 O.L.R. 49; cited to [1909] O.J. No. 5 at paras. 42-43.
89. Olson v. Machin (1912), 8 D.L.R. 188 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (company deducted wages at
source and paid directly to boarding house keeper); Coveney v. Glendenning (1915), 22
D.L.R. 461 (Ont. S.C.) (similar arrangement for storekeeper).
90. Ryan v. Wills (1918), 43 O.L.R. 624 (S.C. [A.D.]) (actress under contract); Domanski
v. Wilson, et al. [1935] O.R. 400 (C.A.).
91. Cases in which Riddell was involved include Olson, Ryan, and Domanski (above), as
well as Mullen v. Millar (1924), 55 O.L.R. 563 (S.C. H.C.J.) aff'd at [1925] 2 D.L.R. 321
(S.C. [A.D.]) (prospectors retained by company but never instructed to go into field unable
to collect from directors on judgment against company for breach of its agreement to pay
them for their travel and waiting time). Claimants lost in each of these cases. Riddell had
a lengthy judicial career but is perhaps best remembered as a prolific legal historian who
wrote across a wide range of topics, mostly in a descriptive manner. For example, see Wil-
liam Renwick Riddell, "Labor Legislation in Canada," Minnesota Law Review 5 (1921):
243-52. For a short biographical sketch and a partial list of his writings, see an obituary,
E.-Fabre Surveyer, "The Honourable William Renwick Riddell," Revue du Barreau 5 (1945):
526-29.
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Quebec judges also split on the nature of the provision. In the first re-
ported Quebec case, Fee v. Turner, the court adopted a purposive approach,
taking the view that the act aimed "to protect to a limited extent those who
were employed by such companies in positions which do not enable them
to judge with any special intelligence what is the company's real financial
position."92 Since directors did or should have knowledge of the danger of
a financial collapse, it was "not inequitable" to hold them responsible for
the wages of workers whose services they continued to utilize. This obliga-
tion, however, did not extend to managers, accountants, or other employees
who could know whether the company's operations were being success-
fully conducted. 93 This analysis, however, was not applied in subsequent
decisions, which reached inconsistent results. Thus in Pilote v. Leclerc et
al.94 and Leclerc v. Beaulieu et al.95 the court held that the director liability
provision of the Quebec general incorporation statute was penal in nature,
while in Dallaire v. Leclerc et al.96 it concluded it was civil.
Courts in Alberta initially adopted a broader view of the scope of their
act's coverage, which included the term "clerks." For example, in Yellow-
head Pass Coal & Coke, Beck, J. (as he then was) did not find the rules of
statutory interpretation very helpful and held that the statute covered a mine
superintendent, bookkeeper, and company doctor, but not the auditor.97
In a subsequent case, Crowder v. Coleman, the Alberta Court of Appeal,
relying on Yellowhead, held that a mine manager was covered because he
had nothing to do with the financial management of the business. Yet the
court also held that there must be strict compliance with the requirements
for returning a judgment unsatisfied because the statute "gives an extraor-
dinary remedy" (Beck, J.A.) and because the remedy against the directors
was "purely statutory" (Clarke, J.A.). Although Stuart, J.A. was of the view
that the statute was remedial and should be interpreted flexibly "to meet the
clear intent of and spirit of the enactment," he reluctantly concurred with
his colleagues.98 A similar approach was adopted in Stevens v. Spencer et
al., with a similar result. Tweedie, J. held that a mining engineer hired to
superintend the construction of a mine was a servant, but the conditions
precedent to recovery against a director must be strictly performed because
92. (1904), 13 Quebec K.B. 435 at 446.
93. Ibid., 446-47. The plaintiff in this case was found to be a manual worker with some
supervisory responsibilities and, therefore, covered by the act.
94. (1917), 52 C.S. 127 at 130.
95. (1924), 63 R.J.O., C.S. 90 at 91, 93.
96. (1918), 53 C.S. 201 at 207.
97. Re Yellowhead Pass Coal & Coke Company, Ltd. (1917), 12 Alta. L.R. 144, at 149-50.
Also, see Crew v. Dallas (1908), 9 W.L.R. 598 (miner paid by results is covered).
98. Crowder v. Coleman et al. [1924] 1 D.L.R. 849 (Alta. S.C.) at 854, 861, 863.
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it was "an extraordinary right."99 There was no suggestion either that in-
corporation as a limited liability corporation was a statutory privilege or
that the wage liability provision was remedial and therefore entitled to a
liberal construction.
The judgment that most fully embraced this alternative view was that
of Albert Elswood Richards"°° in Macdonald v. Drake, a decision of the
Manitoba Court of Appeal. The case did not deal with the scope of cover-
age, but rather with a claim by the defendants that they were not liable as
directors because they each lacked a prescribed qualification to be a direc-
tor. The court unanimously rejected this technical defense as well as the
claim that the statute should be strictly construed. According to Richards,
J. A.:
The claim that the liability under s. 33 is a penalty seems to me incorrect.
Providing that such liability shall exist on the part of directors is, I think, with-
holding from them, in respect of wages, the freedom which the statute would
otherwise give them from personal liability for debts of the Company.
... [P]ersons doing business jointly together without the benefit of a limited
liability Act, are each liable for all the debts of the joint concern. That is the
ordinary position. The limited liability granted by some statutes to sharehold-
ers in corporations is a special privilege, abrogating the ordinary liability of
each for all debts. In granting such limit to liability there is nothing unjust
in providing that the ordinary liability shall again exist in certain cases. That
is all the Legislature has done by enacting section 33.1° 1
Although this judgment was followed in the only other reported Manitoba
case on director's liability prior to World War II, courts in other provinces did
not cite it, although a 1916 treatise on Canadian company law by Montreal
lawyer Victor E. Mitchell adopted the Manitoba position without reference
to contrary views. 1°'
In sum, by the 1930s, despite some variation, the predominant approach
of the courts was to treat limited liability as the norm and director liability
99. Stevens v. Spencer et al. [1929] 4 D.L.R. 838 (Alta. S.C.) at 855-56; aff'd [1930] 3
D.L.R. 993.
100. Albert Elswood Richards was the grandson of William Buell Richards who as a
reform member of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada supported the enact-
ment of the general incorporation statute in 1849 and again in 1850. For a brief biography,
see Dale Brawn, The Court of Queen's Bench of Manitoba, 1870-1950: A Biographical
Sketch (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 172-75 (1 am thankful to Dale Brawn
for giving me pre-publication access to this material).
101. Macdonald v. Drake (1906), 16 Man. L. Rep. 220 at 224.
102. Schumacher v. Moore [193414 D.L.R. 585 (Man. C.A.) (upholding constitutionality
of director liability provision in federal incorporation statute). Victor E. Mitchell, A Treatise
on the Law Relating to Canadian Commercial Corporations (Montreal: Southam Press,
1916), 1077-78.
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for unpaid workers' wages as the exception. This view was most clearly
articulated by F W. Wegenast in his treatise on company law, published in
1931, which became the standard work on the subject for many years. In his
opinion, the idea that director liability for workers' wages merely withheld
from directors the immunity that they otherwise would have been granted by
statute was "[hiistorically and logically" inapplicable to a chartered compa-
ny.' °3 He did not elaborate on this argument, but rather referenced an earlier
discussion in the treatise where he explained limited liability as a logical
extension of the corporation's separate legal personality and not as a statutory
privilege.)" This perspective exemplified the triumph in the first decades of
the twentieth century of what David Millon describes as the "natural entity
theory of the corporation." Unlike the earlier theory, which viewed the cor-
poration as an artificial entity created by the state to promote public policy
objectives, the new theory naturalized the corporation as a legal person, no
different in principle than a natural person and ordinary citizen. In a similar
vein, Paddy Ireland notes that in late nineteenth-century England, the law
increasingly viewed corporations as entities made by people, not of them. ' 5
As the courts naturalized the separate legal personality of the corporation and
the limited liability of the human beings who created and managed them,
the idea that these were privileges faded from view. Although not all judges
and commentators accepted this approach, 10 6 most did.
The coverage of wage protection legislation was only legislatively ex-
panded to reflect the emergence of a more general conception of the category
of employment after World War II. For example, in Ontario the definition
103. Wegenast, Law of Canadian Companies, 385. Wegenast represented the Canadian
Manufacturers Association at a royal commission hearings looking into workers' compen-
sation from 1911-13. For a discussion of his role, see R. C. B. Risk, "'This Nuisance of
Litigation': The Origins of Workers' Compensation in Ontario," in Essays in the History of
Canadian Law, ed. David H. Flaherty (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1983), 2:418-91. Carswell,
a Canadian legal publisher, reprinted Wegenast's corporate law treatise in 1979.
104. Wegenast, Law of Canadian Companies, 5.
105. Millon, "Theories of the Corporation," 211-16; Ireland, "Capitalism without Capital-
.ists," 47. The Canadian business press publicized the emerging English view. For example,
the Monetary and Commercial Times (1871), 4:28, 549, reprinted an excerpt from an Eng-
lish business publication: "The doctrine of limited liability has at length become familiar
to Englishmen. It has been adopted as the law of the land, and the tendency of legislation
is rather to extend than diminish its operation. It is well understood that when a contract is
made with a limited liability company or joint-stock company, the persons who compose the
company are not made liable beyond the amount of the unpaid shares they hold."
106. See, for example, Marie-Louis Beaulieu, "De la Responsibilit6 des Directeurs de
Compagnies pour le Salaire des Employds," Revue du Droit 9 (1930-31): 218-23, 483-91,
at 220-21: "Disons donc que le 1gislateur a simplement mis de c6td, en faveur de l'ouvrier,
le privilege accordd aux directeurs de ne pas 6tre responsables des dettes de la compagnie.
... Et il n'y a I rien d'injuste, non plus."
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of protected workers was expanded by the addition of the words "and other
wage earners" after "apprentice" in 1953 when the Companies Act was sub-
stantially revised and recast as the Corporations Act, and it was only in 1970
that the term "employee" was inserted to delineate who was entitled to claim
against directors for unpaid wages. Even then the break with the idiom of
master and servant was incomplete as the act further stipulated that coverage
was limited to employees "to whom the Master and Servant Act applies."'17
That qualification was dropped in a 1982 overhaul.108 Federally, the term
"employee" only displaced the list of protected workers in 1974. °9
By this time the courts also accepted the broadened scope of personal
protection. In 1974, the Ontario Court of Appeal was dismissive of the
authority of Welch. Arnup, J.A., speaking for the court, wrote: "In con-
struing a law that is 'always speaking,' I am not prepared to be bound by
the construction placed upon an 1874 statute in 1895." Arnup accepted
that the provision was a remedial one to which s. 10 of the Interpretation
Act applied, entitling it to "such fair, large and liberal construction and
interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act
according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.""' The court, however,
refused to articulate a "general rationale" and based its conclusion on the
circumstances of the particular case and on the 1953 amendment in force
at the time. "' This brought to an end litigation over who was covered but,
as we shall see in the next section, the clash between the remedial thrust
of the director liability provision and the judicially entrenched norm of
shareholder and director limited liability was soon to raise its head again,
this time in relation to the question of what was covered.
IV. The Triumph of Limited Liability over Wage Protection, Round
2: Director Liability for Unpaid Termination and Severance Pay
The 1850 Province of Canada statute made shareholders liable for "all debts
that may be due and owing ... for services performed for such Company."
Subsequent legislation limited the amount a worker could claim to either
107. S.O. 1953, c. 19, s. 73(1); Ontario Business Corporations Act, S.O. 1970, c. 25, s.
139.
108. S.O. 1982, c. 4, s. 131. The master and servant act was renamed the Employer and
Employee Act in 1990. R.S.O. 1990, c. E.12.
109. S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 33, s. 114.
110. It is interesting to note that the Baldwin-Lafontaine government first passed the
Interpretation Act in 1849, the year following their election. They distrusted the judiciary
composed largely of Tory appointees. On the checkered history of s. 10 of the Interpreta-
tion Act, see Eric Tucker, "The Gospel of Statutory Rules Requiring Liberal Interpretation
According to St Peter's," University of Toronto Law Journal 35 (1985): 113-53.
111. Zavitz v. Brock et al. (1974), 3 O.R. (2d) 583 (C.A.).
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one year's or six-months' wages. 2 This formulation has remained essen-
tially unchanged until today, yet the scope of a workers' entitlement was
not the subject of dispute until the 1980s when the question of director
liability for termination and severance pay began to be litigated.
Why had such claims not surfaced earlier? After all, even in the nine-
teenth century, Canadian common law held that contracts of indefinite
hiring were terminable by giving notice and that a worker who was fired
summarily without cause could sue for wrongful dismissal and be awarded
pay in lieu of notice-that is termination pay. As well, workers who were
hired on fixed term contracts could sue if they were terminated without just
cause prior to the end of their contracts." 3 Yet prior to the 1980s there is no
reported case of workers suing directors for unpaid termination pay. The
most likely reason for the absence of litigation on this point is that very
few claims were made for wrongful dismissal and nearly all of them were
by managerial and professional employees, exactly the group of workers
held not to be covered by the statute. Moreover, even if an hourly paid
worker had claimed wrongful dismissal it is likely that a court would have
found that the notice to which the worker was entitled was so short as to
make the exercise futile.
A number of developments in the 1970s dramatically changed the social
and legal landscape. As already noted, director liability provisions in cor-
poration statutes were amended to extend their coverage to all employees.
As well, the growth of the standard employment relationship following
World War II meant that there were more long-term employees whose
greater seniority entitled them to longer notice periods. By the 1970s,
however, the long post-war boom began coming to an end, producing a
harsher labor market climate featuring mass lay-offs, factory closures,
and increased precariousness for all workers." 4 Business bankruptcies
also increased dramatically from around 3000 annually in 1974 to nearly
11,000 in 1982. Then, following a brief economic recovery, the number
of annual bankruptcies peaked in 1996 at about 15,000.115 Not only did
112. S. Prov. Can. 1850, c. 28, s. 17. The first limitation appeared in S. Prov. Can. 1860,
c. 61, s. 53.
113. McGuffin v. Cayley (1846), 2 U.C.R. 308 (Q.B.); Raines v The Credit Harbour Com-
pany (1844), 1 U.C.Q.B. 174; Broughton v. Corporation of Brantford (1869), 19 U.C.C. P.
434; McIntyre v. Hockin (1890), 16 O.A.R 498, 501 (C.A.).
114. On the return of mass unemployment in Canada in the 1970s and 1980s, and its
implications for state policy, see Stephen McBride, Not Working (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1992). On the rise and decline of the standard employment relation in Canada,
see Leah Vosko, Temporary Work (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
115. Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, An Overview of Canadian In-
solvency Statistics to 2004 (Industry Canada, 2006), 22, online at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca
/epic/internet/inbsf-osb.nsf/vwapj/StatsBooklet2006-EN.pdf/$FILE/StatsBooklet2O06-EN.
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the increase in bankruptcies result in larger numbers of employees with
unpaid wage claims,116 but the harsher economic climate generally also led
to an increase in the amount of termination and severance pay to which
individual workers were entitled as downsized supervisory and managerial
workers who faced an uncertain labor market claimed longer notice periods
and found a sympathetic judiciary."7 Moreover, in response to political
pressure to address this development, many governments enacted statutory
notice provisions covering most employees. In Ontario, for example, notice
and termination pay were first introduced into the Employment Standards
Act (ESA) in 1970 and in 1974 additional requirements were imposed in
the case of mass terminations. Then in 1981 the legislature also granted
terminated employees in larger firms an entitlement to severance pay."8 As
a result of these changes, the amount of unpaid termination and severance
pay was typically far greater than the amount of unpaid salary and wages
when firms became insolvent, and so their recovery from directors became
an important objective. But these claims also clearly raised the stakes for
directors-who were jointly and severally liable regardless of whether the
company was closely held or publicly traded, or whether they were major
shareholders, active managers, or outside directors-and the question of
their liability for these claims was soon before the courts." 9
Before turning to the cases, it will be helpful to identify the three sources
of entitlement to termination and severance pay, since that sometimes af-
fected the court's judgment about whether the money owing was a debt for
services rendered to the corporation. First, employment standards laws in
every province now provide minimum notice periods for most employees
pdf (5 March 2007). (Thanks to my colleague Stephanie Ben-Ishai for referring me to this
source.)
116. A government commissioned study conducted in 1981 covering the years 1976-80
estimated that there were roughly 25,000 bankruptcies over this period and that unpaid wage
claims were made in 9.3 percent of the cases. The average employee was owed $900. At the
time, unpaid employees were given a limited priority over other unsecured creditors, but the
increase in security financing reduced the effectiveness of this form of wage protection. See
Committee on Wage Protection in matters of Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Wage Protection in
Matters of Bankruptcy and Insolvency (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 198 1).
117. Geoffrey England, Individual Employment Law (Toronto: Irwin, 2000), 244-45
("The general trend since the 1950s has been for courts to lengthen the reasonable notice
period, the paramount objective being to help employees withstand the financial blow of
unemployment").
118. S.O. 1970, c. 45, s. 4; S.O. 1974, c. 112, s. 40; S.O. 1981, c. 22.
119. Also, many statutes make directors absolutely liable for unpaid wage claims, while
others allow a due diligence defense. See Industry Canada, Efficiency and Fairness in Business
Insolvencies (2001), 6-7 available online at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/intemet/incilp-pdci
.nsf/en/h_c100197e.html (5 March 2007).
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or for payment in lieu of notice. In Ontario and the federal jurisdiction,
the legislation also provides for an additional payment, known as sever-
ance pay, to long-term employees who are terminated by large employers.
Second, the terms of an individual contract of employment or a collective
agreement may stipulate the entitlement of employees who are terminated
without just cause, provided that the amount is not less than the statutory
minimum. Third, at common law there is an implied right to reasonable
notice of termination in contracts of indefinite hiring and a worker who is
summarily dismissed without notice or pay in lieu of notice can sue for
wrongful dismissal. There is no separate claim for severance pay under
Canadian common law.
120
The first case in which the liability of directors for unpaid termination
and severance pay arose was Mesheau v. Campbell et al., a 1982 decision
of the Ontario Court of Appeal. A terminated employee won a common law
wrongful dismissal action against his corporate employer. When he could not
collect on the judgment, he sued the directors under the Canada Business
Corporations Act (CBCA). The court denied the claim. A brief judgment
held that damages for wrongful dismissal are not a debt for services per-
formed for the corporation.12' This approach was followed in subsequent On-
tario cases, involving express contractual obligations as well as ESA-based
claims for termination and severance pay. 122 The court of appeal in Alberta
reached a similar conclusion based on its interpretation of the province's
business corporations act.123 Courts of appeal in two other jurisdictions,
however, viewed the matter differently. In Saskatchewan, the court held
that common law damages for wrongful dismissal fell within the statutory
definition of wages because they are "compensation for personal services
due to the employer." As wages, they are a debt for services performed and,
therefore, directors are liable.'24 In Manitoba, the court of appeal upheld
a labor board decision that found directors liable for severance pay owed
pursuant to a contractual agreement.125 Finally, the Quebec Court of Appeal
split on the issue. In Schwartz v. Scott the court held that severance payments
120. For an overview, see England, Individual Employment, ch. 9.
121. (1982), 39 O.R. (2d) 702. The court cited Welch for the history of the section, but
not for its approach to statutory interpretation.
122. Mills-Hughes et al. v. Raynor et al. (1988), 63 O.R. (2d) 343 (C.A.); Vopni v. Groen-
wald (1991), 84 D.L.R. (4th) 366 (Ont. Gen. Div.). In the former case, the contract stipulated
the severance payable under it was not for past services. In the latter, McKeown, J. stated
expressly that the statute created a liability that was an exception to the rule that there is no
personal liability of directors for corporate debts and so, therefore, the liability should be
interpreted strictly (at 369).
123. Audia v. Ng [1993] A.J. No. 251.
124. Meyers v. Walters Cycle Co. (1990) 71 D.L.R. (4th) 190 (C.A.).
125. Francis v. Fruck [1992] M.J. No. 520.
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due under a collective agreement formed part of the employees' remunera-
tion and, therefore, was a debt due for services rendered, even though it
also held that director liability provisions should be narrowly interpreted
because they derogate from the norm of limited liability. 126 Five years later,
another panel of the Qudbec Court of Appeal distinguished Schwartz and
followed Meshau in a civil damages case.
127
The question of directors' liability for unpaid termination and severance
pay reached the Supreme Court of Canada in Barrette v. Crabtree, a case
from Qudbec, which arose out of a civil action by twenty-nine managerial
employees who had been terminated without notice. They were awarded
$300,000 for wrongful dismissal, which they sought to collect from the
directors of their federally incorporated employer when the company de-
faulted. L'Heureux-Dub6, J. wrote the court's unanimous judgment denying
the claim on the ground that damages for failure to give adequate notice
is not a debt for services performed for the corporation.
28
The judgment exemplifies the juridical triumph of limited liability over
the remedial thrust of labor and employment law and so merits careful
scrutiny. It begins by recognizing that the director liability provision of
the CBCA, s. 114(1), is ambiguous and that different rules of statutory
interpretation could be applied to produce different results. 2 9 L'Heureux-
Dub6 then turns to the statute's history. She correctly identifies its origin
in the 1848 New York State statute, but misses completely the debates that
preceded its enactment in New York or in pre-confederation Canada. 30 Per-
haps for this reason, her judgment never considers the view that protecting
workers' wages through shareholder liability was a condition of granting
investors the privilege to form limited liability corporations.
Of course, L'Heureux-Dub6 recognizes that the purpose of director li-
ability is to protect employees in the event of a bankruptcy or insolvency
of a corporation and she also accepts that employees are entitled to more
protection than ordinary creditors because of their special vulnerabili-
ty.' 31 However, she positions these observations against "the specific legal
framework of s. 114(1).... In terms of the general principles governing
company law, the provision is exceptional .... First, the rule departs from
the fundamental principle that a corporation's legal personality remains
distinct from that of its members. In so doing s. 114(1) C.B.C.A. creates
126. Schwartz v. Scott [1985] Que. C.A. 713.
127. Turcot c. Conso Graber Inc. [1990] A.Q. No. 1030.
128. (1993), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 66.
129. Ibid., 71.
130. Ibid., 71-75. Indeed, the judgment misses the pre-Confederation roots of the Ca-
nadian law.
131. Ibid., 75-77.
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an exception to the more general principle that no one is responsible for
the debts of another. It is against this background that the present appeal
must be considered."'
3 2
Thus we see the inversion triumphant. L'Heureux-Dub, J.'s interpreta-
tion constitutes as legal bedrock the corporation's separate legal personality
and the principle of limited liability, which combine to shield shareholders
and managers of corporations from any personal responsibility for its debts.
From there it follows that director liability for workers' wages is excep-
tional and, therefore, to be interpreted narrowly. Against this interpretive
background, L'Heureux-Dub6, J. characterizes termination and severance
pay as damages arising from non-performance of a contractual obligation
to give sufficient notice, rejecting the alternative view that entitlement to
termination pay flows from the performance of service to the corpora-
tion. 33
Having made a series of interpretive choices, L'Heureux-Dub6, J. con-
cludes the judgment by implausibly denying that the court had any agency
in the matter.
However much sympathy one may feel for the appellants, who have been
deprived of certain benefits resulting the contract of employment with their
employer, that does not give a court of law the authority to confer on them
rights which Parliament did not intend them to have .... Only Parliament is
in a position, if it so wishes, to extend these benefits after weighing the con-
sequences of so doing. This, in the final analysis, remains a political choice
and cannot be the function of the courts.
34
But even as the court denies that it is making choices in the interpreta-
tion of an admittedly ambiguous legislative provision, its judgment uses
language that vindicates the alternative view that it rejected. For if these
workers are being "deprived of certain benefits resulting from the contract
of employment" then surely it is also fair to conclude that the amount ow-
ing was a debt for a service provided. The provision of service is, after all,
the consideration that makes enforceable the implied contractual duty to
provide notice of termination or pay in lieu.1
35
In this regard, it is interesting to note that in other contexts where courts
132. Ibid., 77-78. She also notes that director liability under this section of the statute




135. See Patrick Mackelm, "Developments in Employment Law: The 1992-93 Term,"
Supreme Court Law Review 5, 2nd ser. (1994): 269-335 at 285-86 (recognizing this al-
temative view and suggesting that L'Heureux-Dub6, J.'s choice may be due to her view of
employment as status rather than contract based).
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have been asked to consider the juridical character of termination and
severance pay, they have concluded that these are wages payable as com-
pensation for services performed for the employer. For example, prior to
Barrette, courts of appeal in Saskatchewan and British Columbia had held
that termination and severance pay were wages for the purposes of their
employment standards legislation. In both cases, the court based its deter-
mination on the statutory definition of wages, which in neither case made
specific reference to these types of payments. 3 6 In the British Columbia
case, McLachlin, J.A. (now the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Canada) unreservedly declared: "Severance pay is a contractual obliga-
tion of the employer incurred in exchange for the employee's services or
labour. As such, it constitutes compensation payable for those services or
labour."'37
As well, since Barrette the Supreme Court of Canada considered the
juridical nature of termination and severance pay in Wallace v. United
Grain Growers. '3 8 The issue arose in the context of determining whether
a bankrupt could pursue a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal. The
outcome hinged on whether these damages came within a statutory excep-
tion for "salary, wages or other remuneration from a person employing
the bankrupt."'3 Speaking for the majority, Iacobucci, J. accepted that the
bankrupt was entitled to sue.
As I see the matter, the underlying nature of the damages awarded in a wrong-
ful dismissal action is clearly akin to "wages" referred to in s. 68(1)....
The fact that this sum is awarded as damages at trial in no way alters the
fundamental character of the money. As an award of damages in a wrongful
dismissal action is in reality the wages that the employer ought to have paid
the employee either over the course of the period of reasonable notice or as
pay in lieu of notice. 4°
In a dissenting judgment concurred in by two other judges, McLachlin, J.
(as she then was) agreed with Iacobucci, J.'s conclusion on this point.1
4'
136. Bott v Mel City Electric Ltd (1988), 64 Sask. R. 218 (C.A.); Citation Industries
Ltd. v. British Columbia (Director of Employment Standards (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 347
(B.C.C.A.).
137. Citation Industries, 352. Also, see Re Telegram Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Zwelling (1973),
1 O.R. (2d) 592 (ON Div. Ct.), 626, where the court found "with some doubt" that severance
pay, like other fringe benefits, should be regarded as wages under the ESA. That part of the
decision was not challenged on appeal. See (1976) 11 O.R. (2d) 740 (ON C.A.).
138. (1997), 152 D.L.R. (4th) I (S.C.C.).
139. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 68(1).
140. Wallace, 24-25.
141. Ibid., 38. ("Damages in lieu of reasonable notice constitute 'salary, wages or other
remuneration' for the purposes of bankruptcy legislation and hence are recoverable.")
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Not surprisingly in light of this holding, a case was subsequently brought in
Ontario, Englefield v. Wolf '42 seeking to have directors held liable for unpaid
termination and severance pay. Cullity, J., however, declined the invitation
to hold that Wallace effectively reversed Barrette. Apart from the natural
reticence that a lower court judge might feel in making such a determination,
Cullity also sought to reconcile the two cases. He accepted that the protec-
tion of workers' wages was the underlying policy consideration in both the
director liability and the bankruptcy exemption provisions. The difference
was that under the CBCA "other considerations become relevant when it is
sought to make directors-and not the employer-liable." Cullity then quoted
L'Heureux-Dubd's view that director liability was a major exception to the
fundamental principles of company law, demonstrating once again the work
that the inversion performs in limiting wage protection.'43
V. Conclusion
In this article I argue that at least until the mid-nineteenth century, the idea
that investors should be able to pool their capital and not be personally
responsible for the obligations of their joint enterprise was not widely
accepted. A particular concern was that the employees of limited liability
corporations would be unprotected in the event the corporation became
insolvent. Legislatures responded to this sentiment by making shareholders
and then directors personally responsible for workers' wages in the event
the corporation defaulted. This was a condition of granting investors the
privilege of forming limited liability corporations. Within a short time,
however, the courts inverted this understanding, asserting that separate
corporate personality and the limited liability of shareholders and directors
were basic norms and that wage protection was a special privilege. This
assertion became an important basis for reading narrowly the personal
scope of the director liability provision and underpins the Supreme Court
of Canada's determination that the legislation does not make directors
personally liable for termination and severance pay.
It is not a given, however, that the protective dimensions of labor and
employment law must always yield to the norms of capitalist legality. The
dilemma is, indeed, a recurring one. Thus, it is always possible that the
142. [2005] O.J. No. 4895 (Sup. Ct.).
143. Ibid., par. 44. Barrette has also been followed in Brown v. Shearer [1995] M.J. No.
182 (C.A.) (denying liability for severance pay due under the contract of employment)
and Westar Mining Ltd. (Re) (1996), 136 D.L.R. (4th) 564 (B.C.C.A.) (justifying narrow
interpretation of director liability provision in employment standards legislation, resulting
in denial of liability for vacation pay).
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Supreme Court of Canada will revisit the issue of director liability for
termination and severance pay and reach a different conclusion in light of
its decision in Wallace. Also, legislatures may strengthen wage protection
rights in response to narrow judicial interpretations of existing provisions.
For example, as we saw earlier, although it took many years, legislation
was enacted in the post-World War II era to overcome the effects of Welch
v. Ellis and its progeny and make directors liable for all employees' wages,
not just those of the most subordinate. As well, legislation in a few Cana-
dian jurisdictions is currently interpreted to impose personal liability on
directors for termination and severance pay."' Finally, the claim that there
needs to be an effective mechanism to insure that workers will be paid
the wages owed to them when their corporate employer becomes insol-
vent remains strong 45 and proposals to end director liability for workers
wages have not been successful. 14 6 Indeed, at a time when well-publicized
scandals have undermined the legitimacy of the corporation, the norms
of separate legal personality and limited liability may be less secure than
in the recent past. 147
The imposition of liability on directors may not be the optimal or even a
very effective way of protecting workers' wages. 48 The point of this article,
144. For a recent and comprehensive overview of director liability for wages, see Janis P.
Sarra and Ronald B. Davis, Director and Officer Liability in Corporate Insolvency (Markham,
ON: Butterworths, 2002), ch. 5.
145. For example, see the recent federal amendments establishing the wage earner protec-
tion fund, S.C. 2005, c. 47. The law, however, has not yet been declared in force and it is
doubtful that the current minority Conservative government will do so.
146. For a discussion of these developments in Canada, see Ronald B. Davis, "The Bond-
ing Effects of Directors' Statutory Wage Liability: An Interactive Corporate Governance
Explanation," Law & Policy Review 24 (2002): 403-32. Also, see Industry Canada, Efficiency
and Fairness and Canada Business Corporations Act Discussion Paper Directors'Liability
(1995) available online at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/C2-280-7-1995E.pdf (5
March 2007).
147. For example, see Glasbeek, Wealth by Stealth; Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The
Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (New York: Free Press, 2004). It is notable that
since the 1970s there has been an enormous increase in the number of federal and provincial
statutes imposing liability on corporate directors. For example, in Ontario alone by the mid-
1990s there were over 100 federal and provincial statutes imposing liability on directors.
See Ronald J. Daniels, "Must Boards Go Overboard? An Economic Analysis of the Effects
of Burgeoning Statutory Liability on the Role of Directors in Corporate Governance," Ca-
nadian Business Law Journal 24 (1995): 229-58, 230. Also, on the role of judicial piercing
of the corporate veil, see Janis Sarra, "The Corporate Veil Lifted: Director and Officer Li-
ability to Third Parties," Canadian Business Law Journal 35 (2001): 55-71 and Jason W.
Neyers, "Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-Piercing, and the Private Law Model Corporation,"
University of Toronto Law Journal 50 (2000), 173-240. The doctrine has not been used to
recover workers' wages.
148. See Davis, "Bonding Effects" (supports); Marcia T. Moffat, "Director's Dilemma-
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however, is not to defend director liability, but rather to show historically
that when the ground of capitalist legality was in formation it was shaped in
part by popular resistance to some of its features. Shareholder and director
liability for workers' wages is an example of that phenomenon. Within a
matter of years and with the active assistance of the judiciary, the soft ground
of capitalist legality was solidified into the bedrock of the legal system, nar-
rowing the spaces that resistance had created for workers' rights and ensuring
that in the future carving workers' protection out of that bedrock would be
hard work.
An Economic Evaluation of Directors' Liability for Environmental Damages and Unpaid
Wages," University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 54 (1996): 293-326 (too harsh and
leads to over deterrence); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., "Shareholder Liability for Claims by Em-
ployees," Wisconsin Law Review [ 1984]:741-67 (favoring repeal of shareholder liability in
New York and Wisconsin). On the availability of directors' indemnification and insurance
for these liabilities, see Canada Business Corporations Act Discussion Paper Directors'
Liability, 26-39, available online at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/C2-280-7-1995E.
pdf (5 March 2005) and Daniels, "Must Boards," 249-53.
